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Recent studies suggest that the time course for recognizing vocal expressions of basic
emotion in speech varies significantly by emotion type, implying that listeners uncover
acoustic evidence about emotions at different rates in speech (e.g., fear is recognized
most quickly whereas happiness and disgust are recognized relatively slowly; Pell and
Kotz, 2011). To investigate whether vocal emotion recognition is largely dictated by the
amount of time listeners are exposed to speech or the position of critical emotional
cues in the utterance, 40 English participants judged the meaning of emotionally-inflected
pseudo-utterances presented in a gating paradigm, where utterances were gated as a
function of their syllable structure in segments of increasing duration from the end of
the utterance (i.e., gated syllable-by-syllable from the offset rather than the onset of
the stimulus). Accuracy for detecting six target emotions in each gate condition and the
mean identification point for each emotion in milliseconds were analyzed and compared to
results from Pell and Kotz (2011). We again found significant emotion-specific differences
in the time needed to accurately recognize emotions from speech prosody, and new
evidence that utterance-final syllables tended to facilitate listeners’ accuracy in many
conditions when compared to utterance-initial syllables. The time needed to recognize
fear, anger, sadness, and neutral from speech cues was not influenced by how utterances
were gated, although happiness and disgust were recognized significantly faster when
listeners heard the end of utterances first. Our data provide new clues about the relative
time course for recognizing vocally-expressed emotions within the 400–1200ms time
window, while highlighting that emotion recognition from prosody can be shaped by the
temporal properties of speech.
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INTRODUCTION
Emotional events, and more specifically social displays of
emotion—the expression of a face, the tone of a speaker’s
voice, and/or their body posture and movements—must be
decoded successfully and quickly to avoid negative outcomes
and to promote individual goals. Emotional expressions vary
according to many factors, such as their mode of expression
(auditory/visual), valence (positive/negative), power to arouse
(low/high), antecedents, and potential outcomes (see Scherer,
2009 for a discussion). As early as the seventeenth century, these
differences raised the question of the specificity of emotions;
in his Traité “Les Passions de l’Ame,” the French philosopher
Descartes proposed the existence of six “primary” emotions from
which all other emotions are derived. In recent decades, stud-
ies demonstrating accurate pan-cultural recognition of emotional
faces (Izard, 1971; Ekman, 1972) and distinct patterns of auto-
nomic nervous system activity in response to certain emotions
(e.g., Ekman et al., 1983; Levenson, 1992) have served to fuel
the idea of a fixed set of discrete and hypothetically “basic”
emotions, typically anger, fear, disgust, sadness, and happiness,
although opinions vary (see Ekman, 1992; Sauter et al., 2010).
Within this theoretical framework, expressions of basic emotion
possess unique physical characteristics that render them discrete
in communication when conveyed in the face as well as in the
voice (Ekman, 1992), although the vast majority of this work has
focused on communication in the facial channel.
The structure of vocal emotion expressions embedded in spo-
ken language, or emotional prosody, is now being investigated
systematically from different perspectives. Perceptual-acoustic
studies show that basic emotions can be reliably identified and
differentiated at high accuracy levels from prosodic cues alone,
and that these expressions are marked by distinct acoustic pat-
terns characterized by differences in perceived duration, speech
rate, intensity, pitch register and variation, and other speech
parameters (among many others, Cosmides, 1983; Scherer et al.,
1991; Banse and Scherer, 1996; Sobin and Alpert, 1999; Johnstone
and Scherer, 2000; Juslin and Laukka, 2003; Laukka et al., 2005;
Pell et al., 2009). For example, speech rate tends to decrease
when speakers are sad and increase when speakers experience
fear; at the same time, differences in relative pitch height, vari-
ation, and other cue configurations serve to differentiate these
(and other) emotional meanings (see Juslin and Laukka, 2003 for
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a comprehensive review). Similar to observations in the visual
modality, cross-cultural studies on the identification of vocal
emotions show that anger, fear, sadness, happiness, and disgust
can be recognized by listeners at levels significantly above chance
when they hear semantically-meaningless “pseudo-utterances” or
utterances spoken in a foreign language (Scherer et al., 2001;
Thompson and Balkwill, 2006; Pell et al., 2009; Sauter et al.,
2010). These data argue that basic emotions conveyed by speech
prosody exhibit a core set of unique physical/acoustic properties
that are emotion-specific and seemingly shared across languages
(Scherer et al., 2001; Pell et al., 2009).
A critical process that has been underestimated in the charac-
terization of how vocal emotions are communicated is the time
course for recognizing basic emotions in speech. In the visual
modality, the time course for recognizing emotional facial expres-
sions has been investigated by presenting static displays of facial
expressions (Tracy and Robins, 2008) or animated face stimuli
(Becker et al., 2012). In this latter study, the authors used a mor-
phed continuum running from a neutral exemplar to either a
happy or an angry expression and found that happy faces were
recognized faster than angry faces, suggesting temporal specifici-
ties in the process for recognizing basic emotions in the visual
modality (see Palermo and Coltheart, 2004). Since emotional
meanings encoded by prosody can only be accessed from their
temporal acoustic structure, it is surprising that comparative data
on the time course for recognizing basic emotions from prosody
remain sparse.
Recently, two studies (Cornew et al., 2010; Pell and Kotz, 2011)
examined the temporal processing of vocal emotion expressions
using a modified version of Grosjean’s (1980) gating paradigm.
The auditory gating procedure—originally designed to pinpoint
how much acoustic information is needed for lexical access and
word recognition—consists of artificially constructing “gates” as
a function of specific time increments or of relevant linguistic
units of spoken language; the gated stimuli are judged by lis-
teners in blocks of increasing gate duration, typically starting at
the onset of the relevant stimulus, where the last gate presented
usually corresponds to the entire stimulus event (see Grosjean,
1996 for a discussion of methodological variables). An emotional
variant of this paradigm considers how much acoustic informa-
tion is needed for vocal emotions to be registered and consciously
accessed for explicit recognition, using a forced-choice emotion-
labeling paradigm. Given the hypothesis that acoustic patterns
reflect “natural codes” that progressively activate stored con-
ceptual information about basic emotions (e.g., Schirmer and
Kotz, 2006; Wilson and Wharton, 2006), this emotional gating
procedure allows inferences about the time course of emotion
processing in the specific context of speech, and whether the
time needed varies as a function of the emotional signal being
transmitted.
In the first study, Cornew and colleagues (2010) presented
English-like pseudo-utterances spoken in a happy, angry, or neu-
tral prosody to English listeners spliced into 250 millisecond
(ms) gates of increasing duration. Following each stimulus, par-
ticipants made a three-choice forced response to identify the
meaning conveyed. The authors found that listeners required less
time (i.e., exposure to acoustic information) to identify neutral
sentences when compared to angry and happy sentences, suggest-
ing that vocal emotion expressions unfold at different rates (an
effect the authors attributed to a neutral bias in perception). The
idea that vocal emotions unfold at different rates was replicated by
Pell and Kotz (2011), who gated English-like pseudo-utterances
as a function of their syllable structure as opposed to specific
time increments. Forty-eight English participants listened to 7-
syllable utterances conveying one of five basic emotions (anger,
disgust, fear, sadness, happiness) or neutral prosody, beginning
with presentation of only the first syllable of the utterance, the
first two syllables, and so forth until the full sentence was pre-
sented (a six-choice forced response was recorded). Emotion
identification times were then calculated by converting the num-
ber of syllables needed to accurately identify the target emotion
of each utterance without further changes in the participant’s
response at longer gate intervals, into their actual duration for
recognition.
Results showed that there were important emotion-specific
differences in the accuracy and time course for recognizing
vocal emotions, with specific evidence that fear, sadness, neu-
tral, and anger were recognized from significantly less acoustic
information than happiness or disgust, from otherwise iden-
tical pseudo-utterances. Prosodic cues conveying neutral, fear,
and sadness and anger could be detected from utterances last-
ing approximately 500–700ms (M = 510, 517, 576, and 710ms,
respectively), whereas happiness (M = 977ms) and disgust (M =
1486ms) required substantially longer stimulus analysis. Despite
the fact that Cornew et al. (2010) focused on a restricted set
of emotions when compared to Pell and Kotz (3-choice vs. 6-
choice task), and gated their stimuli in a different manner (250ms
increments vs. syllables), there were notable similarities between
the two studies in the average times needed to identify neutral
(444 vs. 510ms), angry (723 vs. 710ms), and happy expressions
(802 vs. 977ms, respectively), although Pell and Kotz’s (2011)
results show that this does not reflect a bias for recognizing neu-
tral prosody as initially proposed (Cornew et al., 2010). Together,
these studies establish that the time course of vocal emotion
recognition in speech varies significantly according to the emo-
tional meaning being conveyed, in line with results demonstrating
emotion-specificity in facial emotion recognition (Becker et al.,
2012), although the relative pattern of emotion-specific differ-
ences observed in the auditory vs. visual modality appears to be
quite different as noted elsewhere in the literature using differ-
ent experimental paradigms (e.g., Wallbott and Scherer, 1986;
Paulmann and Pell, 2011).
Of interest here, closer inspection of Pell and Kotz’s (2011)
data reveal that recognition of happiness and disgust, in contrast to
other basic emotions, improved at relatively long utterance dura-
tions (5–7 syllables); in fact, when full sentences were presented,
recognition of happy prosody was comparable in accuracy to sad-
ness, anger, and fear despite the fact that these latter emotions
were recognized much more accurately than happiness following
brief stimulus exposure. Some emotions such as happiness and
fear seemed to be particularly salient when the last syllables were
presented, leading to significant increases in recognition accuracy
at the end of utterances in that study. These results imply that the
amount of time needed to identify basic emotions from prosody
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depends partly on the position of salient acoustic properties in
speech, at least for certain emotions. Interestingly, Pell (2001)
reported that happy utterances exhibit unique acoustic differences
in sentence-final position when compared to linguistically identi-
cal angry, sad, and neutral utterances, arguing that the position
of acoustic cues, and not just time, is a key factor in communi-
cating vocal emotions in speech. Other data underscore that the
ability to recognize basic emotions varies significantly depending
on the channel of expression—i.e., whether conveyed by facial
expressions, vocal expressions, or linguistic content (Paulmann
and Pell, 2011)—with evidence that fear, sadness, anger, and neu-
tral are effectively conveyed by speech prosody, whereas other
emotions such as happiness or disgust are much more salient in
other channels (Paulmann and Pell, 2011). These findings raise
the possibility that when basic emotions are preferentially com-
municated in channels other than the voice, vocal concomitants
of these emotions are encoded and recognized somewhat differ-
ently; for example, they could be partly marked by local variations
in acoustic cues that signal the interpersonal function or social
relevance of these cues to the listener at the end of a discourse,
similar to how the smile may reflect happiness or may serve
social functions such as appeasement or dominance (Hess et al.,
2002).
Further investigations are clearly needed to understand the
time course of vocal emotion recognition in speech and to
informwhether temporal specificities documented by initial stud-
ies (Cornew et al., 2010; Pell and Kotz, 2011) are solely dictated
by the amount of time listeners require to identify vocal emotions,
or whether linguistic structure plays a role for identifying some
emotions. We tested this question using the same gating paradigm
and emotionally-inflected utterances as Pell and Kotz (2011),
although here we presented pseudo-utterances gated syllable-by-
syllable from the offset rather than the onset of the stimulus (i.e.,
in a “backwards” or reverse direction) to test whether recogni-
tion times depend on how utterances are presented. If the critical
factor for recognizing certain basic emotions in the voice is the
unfolding of acoustic evidence over a set period of time, we
expected similar outcomes/emotion identification times as those
reported by Pell and Kotz (2011) irrespective of how utterances
were gated; this result would establish that modal acoustic prop-
erties for understanding emotions tend to permeate the speech
signal (perhaps due to their association with distinct physiological
“push effects,” e.g., Scherer, 1986, 2009) and are decoded accord-
ing to a standard time course. However, if important acoustic cues
for recognizing vocal emotions are differentially encoded within
an utterance, we should witness significantly different emotion
identification times here when utterances are gated from their
offset when compared to when they are presented from their
onset (Pell and Kotz, 2011). This result could supply evidence
that some emotions are “socialized” to a greater extent in the
context of speech prosody through functionally distinct encoding
processes.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Forty native English speakers recruited through campus adver-
tisements (20 men/20 women, mean age: 25± 5 years) took part
in the study. All participants were right-handed and reported nor-
mal hearing and normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Informed
written consent was obtained from each participant prior to the
study which was ethically approved by the Faculty of Medicine
Institutional Review Board at McGill University (Montréal,
Canada). Before the experiment, each participant completed a
questionnaire to establish basic demographic information (age,
education, language skills).
STIMULI
As described by Pell and Kotz (2011), the stimuli were
emotionally-inflected pseudo-utterances (e.g., The placter jabored
the tozz) selected from an existing database of recorded exem-
plars, validated and successfully used in previous work (e.g., Pell
et al., 2009; Paulmann and Pell, 2010; Rigoulot and Pell, 2012).
Pseudo-utterances mimic the phonotactic and morpho-syntactic
properties of the target language but lack meaningful lexical-
semantic cues about emotion, allowing researchers to study the
isolated effects of emotional prosody in speech (see Scherer et al.,
1991; Pell and Baum, 1997 for earlier examples). The selected
utterances were digitally recorded by two male and two female
speakers in a sound-attenuated booth, saved as individual audio
files, and perceptually validated by a group of 24 native listen-
ers using a seven forced-choice emotion recognition task (see Pell
et al., 2009, for full details). For this study we selected a subset of
120 pseudo-utterances that reliably conveyed anger, disgust, fear,
happiness, sadness and neutral expressions to listeners (20 exem-
plars per emotion). Thirteen unique pseudo-utterance phrases
produced by the four speakers to convey each emotion were
repeated throughout the experiment (see Section Appendix).
These sentences were the same in their (pseudo) linguistic con-
tent as those presented by Pell and Kotz (2011), although the
precise recordings selected here were sometimes different because
some phrases were emotionally expressed by a different speaker
(75% of the chosen recordings were identical to those presented
by Pell and Kotz, 2011). For all emotions, the target meaning
encoded by prosody for these items was recognized at very high
accuracy levels based on data from the validation study (anger =
86%; disgust = 76%; fear = 91%; happiness = 84%; sadness =
93%; neutral = 83%, where chance in the validation study was
approximately 14%). Pseudo-utterances conveying each emotion
were produced in equal numbers by two male and two female
speakers and were all seven syllables in length prior to gate
construction.
GATE CONSTRUCTION
Each utterance was deconstructed into seven gates according to
the syllable structure of the sentence using Praat speech anal-
ysis software (Boersma and Weenink, 2012). As we were inter-
ested in the time course of emotion recognition when utterances
were presented from their end to their beginning, the first Gate
(Gate_7) of each stimulus consisted of only the last syllable of the
utterance, the second gate (Gate_6-7) consisted of the last two
syllables, and so on to Gate_1-7 (presentation of the full utter-
ance). For each of the 120 items, this procedure produced seven
gated stimuli (Gate_7, Gate_6-7, Gate_5-7, Gate_4-7, Gate_3-7,
Gate_2-7, Gate_1-7) each composed of a different number of
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syllables (120× 7 = 840 unique items). Note that since the onset
of most gated stimuli occurred at a syllable break within the utter-
ance (with the exception of Gate_1-7), these stimuli gave the
impression of being “chopped off” at the beginning and starting
abruptly. As shown in Table 1, the duration of items presented
in each gate condition differed by emotion type due to well-
documented temporal differences in the specification of vocal
emotion expressions (Juslin and Laukka, 2003; Pell and Kotz,
2011).
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN/PROCEDURE
Participants were invited to take part in a study of “communica-
tion and emotion”; they were seated in a quiet, dimly lit room
at a 75 cm distance from a laptop screen. SuperLab 4.0 software
(Cedrus, USA) was used to present auditory stimuli played over
volume-adjustable, high-quality headphones.
Seven presentation blocks were built, each containing 120
items with the same gate duration (i.e., number of syllables) pre-
sented successively in blocks of increasing syllable duration. The
first block contained all Gate_7 stimuli (tokens with only the
last syllable), the second block contained all Gate_6-7 stimuli
(last two syllables), and so on until the Gate_1-7 block con-
taining the full utterances was presented. As in Pell and Kotz
(2011), this block design was chosen to mitigate potential arti-
facts such as response perseveration (Grosjean, 1996). Individual
stimuli were randomized within blocks, and participants were
instructed to identify the emotion expressed by the speaker as
accurately and quickly as possible from six alternatives presented
on the computer screen (anger, disgust, fear, sadness, happiness,
neutral). Responses were recorded by a mouse click on the cor-
responding emotion label. Following the emotion response, a
new screen appeared asking participants to rate how confident
they were about their emotional decision along a 7-point scale,
where 1 indicated they were “very unsure” and 7 meant that
they were “very sure” about their judgment. After recording the
confidence rating, a gap of 2 s separated the onset of the next
trial.
Participants completed ten practice trials at the beginning of
the testing session and additional practice trials prior to each
block to become familiar with stimuli representing each gate
duration condition. Participants were allowed to adjust the vol-
ume during the first practice block of each session. Since the
volume of our stimuli was homogenized, only one adjustment
at the beginning was necessary to meet the participants’ indi-
vidual preferences. The full experiment was administered during
two separate 60-min sessions (session 1 = first three gate con-
ditions, session 2 = last four gate conditions) to reduce fatigue
and familiarity with the stimuli. Participants received $25 CAD
compensation for their involvement.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
Participants’ ability to identify emotional target meanings (% cor-
rect) and their associated confidence ratings (7-pt scale) were each
analyzed. From the uncorrected accuracy (hit) rates of each par-
ticipant, Hu-scores were computed for each gate and emotion
to adjust for individual response biases when several emotion
categories are used (see Wagner, 1993). The computation of Hu-
scores takes into account how many stimulus categories and
answer possibilities are given in the forced choice task. If only
two stimulus categories and two answer possibilities are used
(e.g., neutral and anger) the Hu-score for the correct identifica-
tion of one category, say anger, would be computed as follows:
Hu = a/a+ b× a/a+ c. Here a is the number of correctly iden-
tified stimuli (anger was recognized as anger), b is the number
of misidentifications, in which anger was incorrectly labeled as
neutral, whereas c is the number of misidentifications, in which
neutral was incorrectly labeled as anger. Wagner (1993) describes
the Hu-scores as “[. . .] the joint probability that a stimulus cate-
gory is correctly identified given that it is presented at all and that
a response is correctly used given that it is used at all.”
Hu-scores and confidence scores were submitted to sepa-
rate 7× 6 ANOVAs with repeated measures of gate duration
(seven levels) and emotion (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sad-
ness, neutral). To infer how much time participants required to
correctly identify emotions, we computed the “emotion identifi-
cation point” for each of the 120 pseudo-utterances by determin-
ing the gate condition where a participant identified the target
emotion without subsequent changes at longer gate durations
of the same stimulus. The emotion identification points were
then transformed into “emotion identification times” by con-
verting the number of syllables needed to identify the target
into the exact speech duration in milliseconds, which was then
averaged across items for each participant (see Pell and Kotz,
2011 for detailed procedures). Of the 4800 possible identifica-
tion points (20 items × 6 emotions × 40 participants), 419 items
that were not correctly identified by a participant even when the
Table 1 | Duration of the stimuli presented in the experiment in each gate duration condition as a function of emotion.
Emotion Gate condition (# syllables)
G_7 G_6-7 G_5-7 G_4-7 G_3-7 G_2-7 G_1-7
Duration Anger 370 585 771 1004 1230 1581 1759
Disgust 481 748 984 1290 1555 1958 2153
Fear 329 498 636 795 930 1151 1269
Sadness 405 626 815 1071 1286 1645 1846
Happiness 375 601 763 978 1164 1478 1648
Neutral 354 540 703 896 1122 1401 1553
Pseudo-utterances were always gated at syllable boundaries from the offset of the utterance in gates of increasing syllable duration.
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full utterance was presented were labeled as “errors” and omit-
ted from the calculation of emotion identification times (a total
of 4381 data points were included). Mean emotion identifica-
tion times were submitted to a one-way ANOVA with repeated
measures on emotion (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness,
neutral).
Since the stimuli, procedures, and analyses adopted here were
virtually identical to those of Pell and Kotz (2011), our experi-
ment allows unprecedented comparisons of how recognition of
emotional prosody evolves over time as a function of the gating
direction, shedding light on how the position of acoustic patterns
for detecting emotions influences recognition processes. For each
of our three dependent measures (accuracy scores, confidence
ratings, emotion identification times), we therefore performed a
second analysis to directly compare the current results to those
of Pell and Kotz (2011) by entering the between-groups factor
of Presentation Direction (gating from offset vs. onset). Separate
t-tests first compared the age and education (in years) of the
current participant group (n = 40) with participants studied by
Pell and Kotz (2011, n = 48); there was no difference in the for-
mal education of the two samples [17 vs. 16 years, respectively;
t(86) = 1.548; p = 0.125], although participants in the present
study were older on average [25 vs. 22 years; t(86) = 2.578; p =
0.012]. Given the age difference, we entered age as a covariate
in separate mixed ANCOVAs on the Hu-scores, confidence rat-
ings, and emotion identification times as described above with
the additional grouping variable of presentation Direction (onset,
offset) of key theoretical interest in these analyses. For all statis-
tical analyses, a significance level of 5% (two-sided) was selected
and post-hoc comparisons (Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.05) were applied
whenever a significant main or interactive effect was observed.
RESULTS
ACCURACY (HU-SCORES) AND CONFIDENCE RATINGS
Effects of backwards gating on accuracy and confidence scores
Table 2 shows the mean accuracy of participants (% correct target
recognition) in each emotion and gate condition when utter-
ances were presented from their offset, prior to correcting these
scores for participant response bias. A 7 (Gate) × 6 (Emotion)
ANOVA performed on the unbiased emotion recognition rates
(i.e., calculated Hu-Scores) revealed a main effect of Gate
duration [F(6, 228) = 390.48; p < 0.001], Emotion [F(5, 190) =
142.57; p < 0.001], and a significant interaction of these factors
[F(30, 1140) = 10.684; p < 0.001]. Post hoc (Tukey’s) tests of the
interaction first considered how the recognition of each emo-
tion evolved as a function of gate duration when sentences were
gated from their offset. As shown in Figure 1, the recognition of
fear, anger, and sadness significantly improved over the course
of hearing the first three gates (i.e., the last three syllables of
the utterance, ps < 0.003) with no further accuracy gains by
the fourth gate condition (Gate_4-7, ps > 0.115). In contrast,
accurate recognition of neutral, happiness, and disgust each sig-
nificantly improved over a longer time frame corresponding to
the first four gate conditions (Gate_7 to Gate_4-7, ps < 0.001)
without further changes after this point (ps > 0.087).
Further inspection of the interaction then looked at emotional
differences on accuracy at each gate condition. When listen-
ers heard only the utterance-final syllable (Gate_7), fear and
anger prosody were recognized significantly better than all other
emotional voices (ps < 0.006), and fear was also recognized sig-
nificantly better than anger (p < 0.001). After fear and anger, sad
expressions were identified significantly better from the last syl-
lable than happy and neutral expressions (ps < 0.001), which
did not differ (p = 1.000), followed by disgust which was recog-
nized more poorly than any other emotion (ps < 0.046). This
pattern was similar for stimuli composed of the last two and
the last three syllables (Gate_6-7 and Gate_5-7, respectively) but
changed somewhat as stimulus duration increased. After present-
ing the last four syllables (Gate_4-7), fear continued to exhibit
the highest accuracy score (this was true in all gate conditions;
ps < 0.017) but recognition of anger and sad expressions was
equivalent (p = 1.0), followed by happiness which was recog-
nized significantly better than disgust (p < 0.001). After the last
five syllables were presented (Gate_3-7), angry, sad and happy
sentences were recognized at a similar rate (ps > 0.555), sur-
passing neutral and disgust (ps < 0.001). In the two longest
gate conditions (Gate_2-7, Gate_1-7), accuracy scores for anger,
sad, happy and neutral sentences were not statistically different
(ps > 0.407) while vocal expressions of fear and disgust were
respectively the best and worst recognized from speech prosody
(ps < 0.017).
The analysis of associated confidence ratings (on a scale
of 1–7) was restricted to trials in which the emotional target
of the prosody was correctly identified. Two male participants
Table 2 | Mean accuracy (% target recognition) of the 40 listeners who judged pseudo-utterances conveying each emotion according to the
gate duration, when utterances were gated from the offset of the sentence.
Emotion Gate condition (# syllables)
G_7 G_6-7 G_5-7 G_4-7 G_3-7 G_2-7 G_1-7
Accuracy Anger 51.9 (33.9) 73.0 (25.7) 79.9 (22.6) 79.0 (26.9) 80.3 (26.3) 81.8 (22.9) 85.8 (17.9)
Disgust 27.5 (16.9) 44.3 (17.2) 59.3 (13.1) 64.3 (15.7) 71.0 (15.2) 71.4 (15.8) 74.5 (14.5)
Fear 77.5 (15.6) 85.4 (16.0) 91.9 (8.3) 95.9 (3.7) 96.3 (4.1) 95.4 (4.7) 94.6 (3.9)
Sadness 65.6 (22.8) 83.9 (13.9) 87.0 (11.3) 90.9 (12.1) 92.8 (7.5) 95.1 (5.0) 94.4 (6.4)
Happiness 30.6 (27.9) 53.8 (34.4) 66.1 (32.7) 71.8 (32.0) 77.6 (25.9) 82.4 (24.5) 89.1 (13.5)
Neutral 55.3 (12.8) 68.5 (11.8) 73.4 (12.5) 83.9 (10.8) 81.5 (11.2) 85.4 (8.5) 86.6 (8.2)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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FIGURE 1 | Mean Hu-scores (unbiased accuracy) for each emotion as a function of the gate duration (number of syllables).
who failed to recognize any of the disgust expressions (pro-
ducing an empty cell) were excluded from this analysis. The
ANOVA on the confidence scores revealed a main effect of gate
duration [F(6, 192) = 48.653; p < 0.001], a main effect of emo-
tional prosody [F(5, 160) = 46.991; p < 0.001] and a significant
interaction of Gate × Emotion [F(30, 960) = 3.814; p < 0.001].
Confidence scores tended to increase with stimulus/gate duration,
although there were differences across emotions as a function of
gate duration. After listening to the final one or two syllables, par-
ticipants were significantly more confident about their detection
of fear and anger (ps < 0.001) and least confident when they cor-
rectly recognized neutral and disgust (ps < 0.001). Confidence
ratings for happiness and sadness were between those extremes,
differing significantly from the other two emotion sets (ps <
0.048). By the third gate condition (Gate_5-7), confidence about
neutral prosody began to increase over disgust (p < 0.001), and
by the fourth gate condition and when exposed to longer stimuli,
confidence ratings for fear, anger, happiness, and sadness were all
comparable, although confidence about disgust remained signifi-
cantly lower evenwhen full utterances were presented (Gate_1-7).
Impact of gating direction on accuracy and confidence scores
The 2× 7× 6 ANCOVA on Hu-scores gathered here and by
Pell and Kotz (2011) showed a significant three-way interaction
of Direction, Gate duration, and Emotion [F(30, 2550) = 12.636;
p < 0.001]. This interaction allowed us to explore the influence
of presentation direction (onset vs. offset) on the accuracy of
emotional prosody recognition as additional syllables revealed
acoustic evidence about each emotion; these relationships are
demonstrated for each emotion in Figure 2. Step-down analyses
(2x7 ANOVAs) showed that the interaction of Direction × Gate
duration was significant for anger [F(6, 516) = 14.218; p < 0.001],
fear [F(6, 516) = 33.096; p < 0.001], disgust [F(6, 516) = 10.851;
p < 0.001], sadness [F(6, 516) = 11.846; p < 0.001], and happiness
[F(6, 516) = 9.663; p < 0.001]. For each of these emotions, recog-
nition always improved when the end of utterances were heard
first (i.e., when gated from their offset vs. onset), although the
temporal region where accuracy improved within the utterance
varied by emotion type. Post-hoc comparisons showed that anger
and fear were recognized significantly better in the offset presen-
tation condition even when little acoustic evidence was available;
listeners detected anger better over the course of the first to third
syllable in the offset vs. onset condition, and over the course of
the first to sixth syllables for fear (ps < 0.001). Happiness showed
an advantage in the offset condition beginning at the second up to
the fourth gate (ps = 0.027), disgust showed a similar advantage
beginning at the third to the fifth gate (p < 0.049), and sadness
displayed the offset advantage beginning at the third up to the
sixth gate (ps < 0.031). Interestingly, there was no effect of the
direction of utterance presentation on the recognition of neutral
prosody [F(6, 516) = 0.409; p = 0.873].
The ANCOVA on confidence ratings between studies yielded
a significant three-way interaction of Direction, Gate dura-
tion and Emotion [F(30, 2370) = 4.337; p < 0.001]. Step-down
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FIGURE 2 | Comparison of mean accuracy (Hu) scores for each emotion as a function of gate duration (number of syllables) and the direction of
presentation (forward vs. backward). Data in the forward condition are taken from Pell and Kotz (2011).
analyses (2× 7 ANOVAs) run separately by emotion showed
that the interaction of Direction × Gate duration was significant
for anger [F(6, 516) = 35.800; p < 0.001], fear [F(6, 516) = 19.656;
p < 0.001], happiness [F(6, 504) = 18.783; p < 0.001], and sadness
[F(6, 516) = 10.898; p < 0.001]. Listeners were more confident
that they had correctly identified these four emotions only when
one syllable was presented in isolation (i.e., at the first gate dura-
tion, ps < 0.049), with increased confidence when they heard
the sentence-final as opposed to the sentence-initial syllable. For
disgust and neutral, the two-way interaction was also signifi-
cant [F(6, 492) = 7.522; p < 0.001; F(6, 516) = 7.618; p < 0.001,
respectively] but post hoc tests revealed only minor differences
in the pattern of confidence ratings in each presentation condi-
tion with no differences in listener confidence at specific gates
(ps > 0.618). These patterns are illustrated for each emotion in
Figure 3.
EMOTION IDENTIFICATION TIMES
Effects of backwards gating on the time course of vocal emotion
recognition
As described earlier, emotion identification times were computed
by identifying the gate condition from sentence offset where the
target emotion was correctly recognized for each item and partic-
ipant, which was then converted into the precise time value of the
gated syllables in milliseconds. A one-way ANOVA performed on
the mean emotion identification times with repeated measures of
emotion type (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and neutral)
revealed a highly significant effect of emotion [F(5, 190) = 113.68;
p < 0.001]. As can be seen in Figure 3, fearful voices were cor-
rectly identified at the shortest presentation times (M = 427ms),
significantly faster than sadness (M = 612ms), neutral (M =
654ms) and anger (M = 672ms) which did not significantly dif-
fer one from another. These emotions required significantly less
time to identify than happiness (M = 811ms), which in turn
took significantly less time than disgust (M = 1197ms) which
required the longest stimulus exposure for accurate recognition
(all ps < 0.001).
Impact of gating direction on emotion identification times
Finally, a 2× 6 (Direction × Emotion) mixed ANCOVA was
performed on the emotion identification times to compare the
present results to those of Pell and Kotz (2011); this analy-
sis revealed a significant interaction of presentation Direction
and Emotion [F(5, 425) = 13.235; p < 0.001] as also shown in
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FIGURE 3 | Comparison of mean confidence ratings for each emotion as a function of gate duration (number of syllables) and the direction of
presentation (forward vs. backward). Data in the forward condition are taken from Pell and Kotz (2011).
Figure 4. The average time listeners required to correctly identify
emotional prosody was significantly reduced when syllables were
presented from the offset vs. onset of utterances, but only for dis-
gust (p < 0.001) and happiness and (p = 0.050). In contrast to
accuracy and confidence ratings, the manner in which utterances
were gated had no significant impact on the amount of time lis-
teners needed to recognize fear, sadness, anger, or neutral prosody
(all ps > 0.157).
DISCUSSION
Following recent work (Cornew et al., 2010; Pell and Kotz,
2011), this experiment sought a clearer understanding of how
vocal expressions of basic emotion reveal their meanings in
speech using a modified version of the gating paradigm, where
emotionally-inflected pseudo-utterances were truncated and pre-
sented in excerpts of increasing syllable duration from the end of
an utterance.While the current manner for presenting our stimuli
might bear no immediate resemblance to how emotional speech
is encountered in structured conversations–especially because our
stimuli were only auditory and not spontaneously produced (see
Barkhuysen et al., 2010 for a discussion on this topic)—our
performance measures may help to understand some processes
involved when listeners “walk in” on an emotional conversa-
tion, or have their attention directed to emotional speech in the
environment that is already in progress, an experience that is
common to everyday life. Critically, our design allowed important
hypotheses to be tested concerning the evolution and associated
time course of emotional prosody recognition (in English) as lis-
teners are progressively exposed to representative acoustic cue
configurations. In line with past findings, we found that listen-
ers tended to be most accurate at recognizing vocal expressions
of fear (Levitt, 1964; Zuckerman et al., 1975; Paulmann and Pell,
2011; Pell and Kotz, 2011) and least accurate for disgust (e.g.,
Scherer et al., 1991; Banse and Scherer, 1996) irrespective of how
many syllables/gates were presented. Expressions of fear were also
recognized from the shortest stimulus duration, implying that lis-
teners need minimal input to recognize this emotion in speech
(Pell and Kotz, 2011). Interestingly, emotion identification times
were significantly reduced for certain emotions (happiness, dis-
gust) when sentences were presented from their offset rather than
their onset, and there were other apparent “advantages” to rec-
ognizing emotion prosody when listeners were first exposed to
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FIGURE 4 | Comparison of mean identification points (in milliseconds) for each emotion as a function of direction of presentation (forward vs.
backward). Data in the forward condition are taken from Pell and Kotz (2011).
the end of utterances. These effects and their implications are
discussed in detail below.
EFFECTS OF GATING DIRECTION AND CUE LOCATION ON VOCAL
EMOTION RECOGNITION
Our data show that recognition of vocal emotions generally
improves with the number of syllables presented, even when lis-
teners hear utterance fragments in reverse order, but reaches a
plateau for all emotions after hearing the last three to four sylla-
bles of the utterance. When viewed broadly, these findings suggest
that “prototypical” acoustic properties for accessing knowledge
about basic emotions from speech (Laukka, 2005; Pell et al., 2009)
are decoded and consciously recognized at peak accuracy levels
after processing three to four spoken syllables—approximating a
mean stimulus duration of 600–1200ms, depending on the emo-
tion in question (review Table 1). This broad conclusion fits with
observations of two previous gating studies that gated emotional
utterances in syllabic units (Pell and Kotz, 2011) or in 250ms
increments (Cornew et al., 2010). However, there were notable
emotion-specific recognition patterns as a function of gate dura-
tion; when stimuli were very short (i.e., only the final one or
two syllables were presented) there was a marked advantage for
detecting fear and anger when compared to the other expres-
sion types, and listeners were significantly more confident that
they had correctly identified these two emotions based solely
on the utterance-final syllable. As the gate duration gradually
increased to five syllables (Gate_3-7), no further differences were
observed in the ability to recognize anger, sadness, and happi-
ness, although participants remained significantly more accurate
for fear and significantly less accurate for disgust at all stimulus
durations.
The observation that fear, and to a lesser extent anger, were
highly salient to listeners at the end of utterances even when
minimal acoustic information was present (i.e., the final syllable)
is noteworthy. Leinonen and colleagues (1997) presented two-
syllable emotional utterances in Finnish (the word [saara]) and
reported higher recognition scores and distinct acoustic attributes
of productions conveying fear and anger when compared to eight
other emotional-motivational states, suggesting that these emo-
tions are highly salient to listeners in acoustic stimuli of brief
duration. Similarly, Pell and Kotz (2011) reported that recog-
nition of most emotions improved over the full course of the
utterance when they were gated from sentence onset and that
certain emotions, such as happiness and fear, demonstrated clear
gains in that study when listeners processed the last two sylla-
bles of the utterance. When combined with our current findings,
this implies that syllables located towards the end of an utterance
provide especially powerful cues for identifying basic emotions
encoded in spoken language. This argument is supported by our
direct statistical comparisons of the two data sets when utterances
were gated from their onset vs. offset; we found that presentation
direction had a significant impact on the accuracy and confi-
dence levels of English listeners, with improved recognition of
all emotions except neutral when participants heard utterances
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commencing with the last syllable. Gating utterances from their
offset also reduced mean emotion identification times for some
emotions (happiness, disgust) as elaborated below. In contrast,
there was no evidence in our data that listeners were at an advan-
tage to recognize emotional prosody when utterances were gated
from their onset, with the possible exception of accuracy rates for
sadness that were somewhat higher in the onset condition at very
short gate intervals.
Why would natural, presumably biologically-specified codes
for signaling emotions in the voice (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Wilson
and Wharton, 2006) bear an important relationship to the tem-
poral features of spoken language? This phenomenon, which has
been highlighted at different times (Cosmides, 1983; Scherer,
1988), could be explained by the accent structure of utterances
we presented for emotion recognition and by natural processes of
speech production, factors which both contribute to the “social-
ization” or shaping of vocal emotion expressions in the context of
spoken language. It is well known that the accent/phrase structure
of speech, or the relative pattern of weak vs. strong syllables (or
segments) in a language, can be altered when speakers experience
and convey vocal emotions (Ladd, 1996). For example, speak-
ers may increase or decrease the relative prominence of stressed
syllables (through local changes in duration and pitch variation)
and/or shift the location or frequency of syllables that are typ-
ically accented in a language, which may serve as an important
perceptual correlate of vocal emotion expressions (Bolinger, 1972;
Cosmides, 1983). Related to the notion of local prominence, there
is a well-documented propensity for speakers to lengthen syl-
lables located in word- or phrase-final position (“sentence-final
lengthening,” Oller, 1973; Pell, 2001), sometimes on the penul-
timate syllable of certain languages (Bolinger, 1978), and other
evidence that speakers modulate their pitch in final positions to
encode gradient acoustic cues that refer directly to their emo-
tional state (Pell, 2001) to give to the final position of sentences
a special impact in the identification of the emotional quality of
the voice.
The observation here that cues located toward the end of an
utterance facilitated accurate recognition of most emotions in
English likely re-asserts the importance of accent structure dur-
ing vocal emotion processing (Cosmides, 1983; Ladd et al., 1985).
More specifically, it implies that sentence-final syllables in many
languages could act as a vehicle for reinforcing the speaker’s emo-
tion state vis-à-vis the listener in an unambiguous and highly
differentiated manner during discourse (especially for fear and
anger). Inspection of the mean syllable durations of gated stim-
uli presented here and by Pell and Kotz (2011) confirm that
while there were natural temporal variations across emotions,
the duration of utterance-final syllables (M = 386ms, range =
329–481) was more than double that of utterance-initial sylla-
bles (M = 165ms, range = 119–198), the latter of which were
always unstressed in our study. In comparison, differences in the
cumulative duration of gates composed of two syllables (M = 600
vs. 516 in the offset vs. onset conditions, respectively) or three
syllables (M = 779 vs. 711) were relatively modest between the
two studies, and these stimulus durations were always composed
of both weak and stressed syllables. This difference of duration
observed is in line with the above described propensity of speakers
to lengthen syllables located in the final position of the sentences.
Also, given the structure of the pseudo-utterances (see Section
Appendix), it should be noted that the forward presentation of
pseudo-utterances might differ from the backward presentation
in terms of expectations of the participants. In Pell and Kotz
(2011), the first gate was always a pronoun or a determiner and
was always followed by the first syllable of a pseudo-verb, whereas
in the present experiment, the two first gates were always the two
final syllables of a pseudo-word. It is difficult to know whether
participants may have developed some expectations about the fol-
lowing syllable and to what extent these expectations could have
impacted the identification of the prosody. We cannot exclude
that these expectations could have been more difficult to make
in the backward condition, when the gates were presented in
a reverse order, altering how participants focused on the emo-
tional prosody of the sentences. However, such an interpretation
would not explain why the direction of presentation did not
influence the performance of participants when sentences were
uttered with a neutral note and why this influence was limited
to some specific gates when the sentences were spoken in an
emotional way.
Nevertheless, these results suggest that there is a certain
alignment in how speakers realize acoustic targets that refer to
semantically-dictated stress patterns and emotional meanings
in speech, demonstrating that recognition of vocal emotional
expressions is shaped to some extent by differences in the tem-
poral (accent) structure of language and that emotional cues
are probably not equally salient throughout the speech signal.
Further studies that compare our findings with data from other
languages will clearly be needed to advance specific hypotheses
about how vocal emotion expressions may have become “domes-
ticated” in the context of spoken language. For example, we could
replicate forward and backward gating experiments in another
stressed-language like German, and see if critical cues in the iden-
tification of some emotions could be located at different places of
a sentence. We could also compare forward and backward pre-
sentation of pseudo-sentences in a language that does not use
accentuated stress such as French, which supposedly would lead
to similar results in the time needed to identify emotional prosody
irrespective of the direction of presentation of the sentences.
Further reflections on the time course of vocal emotion recognition
While our data show that the position of emotionally mean-
ingful cues plays a role in how vocal emotions are revealed to
listeners, they simultaneously argue that the average time needed
to accurately decode most basic emotions in speech is relatively
constant irrespective of gating method (syllables vs. 250ms incre-
ments) or stimulus set (Cornew et al., 2010; Pell and Kotz, 2011).
When mean emotion identification times were computed here,
fear required the least amount of stimulus exposure to recog-
nize (M = 427ms), followed by sadness (M = 612ms), neutral
(M = 654ms), anger (M = 677ms), happiness (M = 811ms),
and disgust (M = 1197ms). With the exception of neutral which
took slightly (although not significantly) longer to detect when
utterances were gated in reverse, this emotion-specific pattern
precisely mirrors the one reported by Pell and Kotz (2011) for
the same six emotions and replicates Cornew et al.’s (2010) data
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for neutral, anger, and happy expressions when utterances were
gated in 250ms units. When the mean emotion identification
times recorded here are compared to those reported by Pell and
Kotz (2011) and Cornew et al. (2010), it can be said that recog-
nition of fear occurs approximately in the range of 425–525ms
(427, 517ms), sadness in the range of 600ms (612, 576ms), anger
in the range of 700ms (677, 710, 723ms), happiness in the range
of 800–900ms (811, 977, 802ms), and disgust requires analysis of
at least 1200ms of speech (1197, 1486ms). As pointed out by Pell
and Kotz (2011), the time needed to identify basic emotions from
their underlying acoustic cues does not simply reflect characteris-
tic differences in articulation rate across emotions (e.g., Banse and
Scherer, 1996; Pell et al., 2009), since expressions of sadness are
routinely slower and often twice the duration of comparable fear
expressions, and yet these two emotions are accurately recognized
from speech stimuli of the shortest duration. Rather, it can be
claimed that prototypical cues for understanding vocal emotions
are decoded and consciously retrievable over slightly different
epochs in the 400–1200ms time window, or after hearing roughly
2–4 syllables in speech. The idea that emotional meanings begin
to be differentiated after hearing around 400ms of speech fits with
recent priming data using behavioral paradigms (Pell and Skorup,
2008) and event-related potentials (ERPs, Paulmann and Pell,
2010) as well as recent neuro-cognitive models on the time course
and cognitive processing structure of vocal emotion processing
(Schirmer and Kotz, 2006).
Evidence that vocal expressions of certain negative emotions,
such as fear, sadness, or anger, require systematically less audi-
tory input to decode accurately, whereas expressions of happi-
ness and disgust take much longer, may be partly explained by
the evolutionary prevalence and significance of negative emo-
tions over positive emotions (e.g., Cacioppo and Gardner, 1999).
Expressions that signal threat or loss must be decoded rapidly to
avoid detrimental outcomes of great urgency to the organism;
this negativity bias has been observed elsewhere in response to
facial (Carretié et al., 2001) and vocal expressions of fear and
anger (Calder et al., 2001, 2004), and would explain why fear
prosody was recognized more accurately and faster than any other
emotional expression in the voice (Levitt, 1964). The biological
importance of rapidly differentiating negative vocal signals (e.g.,
Scherer, 1986) potentially explains why the amount of tempo-
ral acoustic information, and not the position of critical cues,
appears to be the key factor governing the time course of rec-
ognizing fear, anger, and sadness, since we found no significant
differences in emotion identification times for these emotions
between our two studies.
In contrast, happy and disgust took significantly longer to iden-
tify and were the only emotions for which recognition times
varied significantly as a function of gating direction (with a reduc-
tion in emotion recognition times of approximately 200ms and
300ms between studies, respectively). Difficulties recognizing dis-
gust from prosody are well documented in the literature (Scherer,
1986; Scherer et al., 1991; Jaywant and Pell, 2012) and are some-
times attributed to the fact that disgust in the auditory modality
is more typical in the form of affective bursts such as “yuck” or
“eeeew” (Scherer, 1988; Simon-Thomas et al., 2009). It is possi-
ble that identifying disgust from running speech, as required here
and by Pell and Kotz (2011), activates additional social meanings
that takemore time to analyze and infer than the decoding of pure
biological signals such as fear, sadness, and anger. For example, it
has been suggested that there are qualitatively different expres-
sions of disgust in the visual (Rozin et al., 1994) and auditory
(Calder et al., 2010) modality, including a variant related to viola-
tions of moral standards that is often conveyed in running speech,
as opposed to physical/visceral expressions of disgust which are
better conveyed through exclamations (yuck!). If presentation of
disgust utterances engendered processes for inferring a speaker’s
social or moral attitude from vocal cues, a more symbolic func-
tion of prosody, one might expect a much slower time course as
witnessed here. A similar argument may apply to our results for
happiness; although this emotion is typically the quickest emo-
tion to be recognized in the visual modality (Tracy and Robins,
2008; Palermo and Coltheart, 2004; Calvo and Nummenmaa,
2009), it exhibits a systematically slower time course in spoken
language (Cornew et al., 2010; Pell and Kotz, 2011). Like disgust,
happiness may also be communicated in a more rapid and reli-
able manner by other types of vocal cues that accompany speech,
such as laughter (e.g., Szameitat et al., 2010). In addition, there is
probably a need to differentiate between different types of vocal
expressions of happiness which yield different rates of percep-
tual recognition (Sauter and Scott, 2007). Nonetheless, our results
strongly imply that speakers use prosody to signal happiness, par-
ticularly towards the end of an utterance, as a conventionalized
social cue directed to the listener for communicating this emo-
tion state (Pell, 2001; Pell and Kotz, 2011), perhaps as a form
of self-presentation and inter-personal expression of social affil-
iation. Further inquiry will be needed to test why disgust and
happiness appear to be more socially mediated than other basic
emotions, influencing the time course of their recognition in
speech, and to define the contexts that produce variations in these
expressions.
Interestingly, the recognition of neutral prosody was uniquely
unaffected by the manner in which acoustic information was
unveiled in the utterance, with no significant effects of pre-
sentation direction on accuracy, confidence ratings, or emotion
identification times between studies. This tentatively suggests that
the identification of neutrality, or a lack of emotionality in the
voice, can be reliably inferred following a relatively standard
amount of time in the range of 400–650ms of stimulus exposure
(Cornew et al., 2010; Pell and Kotz, 2011). Since our measures of
recognition include conscious interpretative (naming) processes
and are biased somewhat by the gating method, our data on the
time course for neutral prosody are not inconsistent with results
showing the on-line differentiation of neutrality/emotionality in
the voice at around 200ms after speech onset, as inferred from
amplitude differences in the P200 ERP component when German
utterances were presented to listeners (Paulmann et al., 2008).
One can speculate that listeners use a heuristic or default pro-
cess for recognizing neutral voices whenever on-line analysis
of prosody does not uncover evidence of emotionally mean-
ingful cue configurations; presumably, this process for rejecting
the presence of known acoustic patterns referring to emotions,
like the process for decoding known patterns, is accomplished
over a relatively stable time interval. To test these possibilities,
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it would be interesting to modify neutral sentences by inserting
local variations in emotionally-meaningful acoustic features at
critical junctures in time to determine if this “resets the clock”
for inferring the presence or absence of emotion in speech.
CONCLUSION
Following recent on-line (ERP) studies demonstrating that vocal
emotions are distinguished from neutral voices after 200ms of
speech processing (Paulmann and Kotz, 2008), and that emotion-
specific differences begin to be detected in the 200–400ms time
window (Alter et al., 2003; Paulmann and Pell, 2010), our data
shed critical light on the time interval where different emotion-
specific meanings of vocal expressions are fully recognized and
available for conscious retrieval. While it seems likely that the
phrase structure of language governs local opportunities for
speakers to encode emotionally-meaningful cues that are highly
salient to the listener, at least in certain contexts, there are remark-
able consistencies in the amount of time listeners must monitor
vocal cue configurations to decode emotional (particularly threat-
ening) meanings. As such, the idea that there are systematic
differences in the time course for arriving at vocal emotional
meanings is confirmed. To gather further information on how
social factors influence the communication of vocal emotional
meanings, future studies using the gating paradigm could present
emotional utterances to listeners in their native vs. a foreign lan-
guage; this could reveal whether specificities in the time course for
recognizing emotions manifest in a similar way for native speakers
of different languages, while testing the hypothesis that accurate
decoding of vocal emotions in a foreign language is systemati-
cally delayed due to interference at the phonological level (Van
Bezooijen et al., 1983; Pell and Skorup, 2008).
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APPENDIX
A list of pseudo-utterances produced to convey each target emo-
tion that were gated for presentation in the experiment.
1. I tropped for swinty gowers.
2. She kuvelled the noralind.
3. The placter jabored the tozz.
4. The moger is chalestic.
5. The rivix joled the silling.
6. The crinklet is boritate.
7. She krayed a jad ralition.
8. We wanced on the nonitor.
9. They pannifered the moser.
10. We groffed for vappy laurits.
11. I marlipped the tovity.
12. The varmalit was raffid.
13. They rilted the prubition.
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